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Many cite improved seed technologies as vital to addressing
the challenge of food insecurity, especially when faced with
combined stresses of global climate change, population growth,
and natural resource depletion (Anthony and Ferroni 2012; Lipton
2007). As improved seeds find their way into the developing world,
policymakers are struggling to find the appropriate institutional
mechanisms to regulate their creation and use. Arguments over
intellectual property rights (IPR) are central to this debate. Some
activists in the Global South are distrustful of any IPR regime that
creates private ownership over seeds, whereas international
financial institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO)
encourage stronger IPR protections for commercial seed
breeders creating new plant varieties. Policymakers face two
conflicting imperatives in making these policies: (1) promote
improved seed development and distribution in ways that will
encourage new seed innovations and protect the interests of
commercial breeders and (2) protect the interests of farmers who
serve as both a source of vital germplasm and as the potential
users of these improved seeds. In this policy brief, we consider
the sources of these conflicting imperatives for developing nations
to protect the rights of commercial plant breeders and small
farmers, as well as some examples of national policies trying to
balance those demands.
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Developing nations face two conflicting visions of property
rights related to new genetic material in the international
agreements related to the development and distribution of
improved seed. On the one hand, a more traditional view of
private ownership undergirds the IPR system required by the
WTO through its Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) agreement designed to promote the ownership
rights of those creating new hybrid or transgenic seeds. On the
other hand, an alternative and more collective view of ownership
underlies the requirements to protect the interests of farmers who
nurture and maintain traditional seeds that provide germplasm for
improved hybrid and transgenic seeds, as codified in another
international treaty, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).
Each international agreement is critical to understanding the often
conflicting impulses that are found in the efforts of many
developing nations to regulate the development and use of
improved seeds.
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1. Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS)
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Article 27(3) b of the TRIPS agreement requires all WTO
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2
members to adopt a stronger IPR system for
protecting new plant varieties developed by plant
breeders. The agreement requires either the ability
to legally patent new plant varieties, or the creation
of a sui generis “plant variety protection” (PVP) law
that protects breeder’s rights. Developed countries
such as the US and Japan use patent systems for
protecting new plant varieties, but most developing
countries have created sui generis PVP rules
following the Union for Protection of New Varieties
of Plants (UPOV) conventions (UPOV 1978 or
UPOV 1991). Thus, the TRIPS agreement has led
to approaches to protecting breeders’ IPR ranging
from the strongest property rights under the patent
system to weaker property rights under the UPOV
principles, especially the 1978 agreement.
According to supporters of the TRIPS approach,
following classic economic theory, stronger
intellectual property rights over new plant varieties
for breeders should speed innovation and diffusion
of new improved seed varieties. In practice,
however, the TRIPS rules appear to have had mixed
results in promoting innovation and in enabling
transfer of new seed technologies (Tripp, Louwaars,
and Eaton 2007; Kolady, Spielman, and Cavalieri
2012), and may be exacerbating wealth inequalities
between the Global North and the Global South
(Laxman and Ansari 2012; Srinivasan 2003).
Convention on Biological Diversity
In contrast to the TRIPS agreement, the CBD is
a 1993 international agreement that aims for
“conservation of biological diversity, sustainable use
of its components and the fair and equitable sharing
of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic
resources, including by appropriate access to
genetic resources and by appropriate transfer of
relevant technologies....” In this respect, the CBD
balances the rights of breeders with a requirement
to ensure equitable benefit sharing with farmers,
including mutually agreeable terms and prior
informed consent for use of local seed lines or
germplasm in developing improved seeds. Thus,
the CBD argues for the recognition of farmers’
rights, insisting that farmers be rewarded and
compensated for their traditional knowledge that
may have contributed to the development of new
commercial plant varieties. Consistent with this
emphasis on benefit sharing and farmers’ rights, the
CBD promulgates a more collective form of
ownership than TRIPS, conceiving of landraces and
indigenous seed lines as genetic resources that are
shared assets for the local communities that
Policy Brief

develop and nurture them. This approach
recognizes
that
unlike
commercial
seed
development, indigenous plant varieties are often
created and maintained through informal and
collective knowledge generation, making it difficult
to attribute traditional property rights for a local
germplasm or seed variety to a particular person or
entity (Brush 2007).
Important IPR Terms and Acronyms

CBD

Convention on
Biological
Diversity

EDV

Essentially
derived varieties

IPR

Intellectual
property rights

NDUS

Novelty,
distinctiveness,
uniformity, and
stability

PPVFRA

The Protection of
Plant Varieties
and Farmers
Rights Act

PVP law

Plant variety
protection law

TRIPS

Trade related
aspects of
intellectual
property rights
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International treaty
protecting global
biodiversity and fair
exchange of genetic
material, requiring
informed consent and
benefit sharing for any
use of local biological or
genetic resources.
Plant varieties that are
sufficiently close
genetically to an original,
protected seed variety to
give the original breeder
IPR rights over these
varieties.
Grants ownership over a
new process or material,
such as a new technique
for developing improved
seeds, or a new seed
variety that meets NDUS
standards.
Four standards often
required for a new seed
variety to be eligible for
IPR protection under
many PVP laws.
India’s primary legislation
for TRIPS compliance.
Exhibits several features
protecting breeder’s
rights as well as
protecting the rights of
farmers.
Law that extends private
property rights to new
plant varieties, usually to
commercial plant
breeders.
1995 WTO agreement
that extended private
property rights to plant
varieties and mandated
member countries pass
PVP legislation.
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UPOV
(1978 and
1991)

International
Union for the
Protection of
New Plant
Varieties
convention
agreement

WTO

World Trade
Organization

International treaties that
regulate plant breeders’
rights; often used as
guide for national PVP
laws responding to
TRIPS. 1991 version
tends to favor commercial
breeder rights more
strongly.
Intergovernmental
organization regulating
international trade.

3. Different Provisions for Balancing Farmer
and Breeder Rights
Governments confront a number of specific
issues in trying to balance the protection of
breeders’ rights required by TRIPS and the
protection of farmers’ rights mandated by the CBD.
We briefly review some of those key provisions
here.
Protecting Collective and Informal Farming
Practices in PVP Legislation
Countries vary in how their PVP policies provide
farmers’ exemptions to breeders’ rights. Under
UPOV 1978, protected new plant varieties can be
used by other breeders (including farmers) for
creating additional varieties. The 1991 UPOV
strengthened breeders' rights, however, by granting
rights over Essentially Derived Varieties (EDVs)
from an original seed to the original breeder. This
provision is a potential barrier for farmers who have
traditionally developed new varieties by breeding
indigenous seeds with seeds protected by PVP
laws, making the resulting “farmers’ varieties”
potentially a violation of the 1991 UPOV rules. In
addition, UPOV 1978 allows farmers to engage in
collective seed exchange and seed saving even of
protected seeds for non-commercial purposes,
whereas UPOV 1991 does not allow seed exchange
of protected plant varieties. Countries today follow
both models, permitting different amounts of
traditional seed saving and breeding practices by
subsistence farmers.
Informed Consent and Benefit Sharing
According to many analysts, commercial
breeders and small farmers can both benefit from
the sharing of genetic resources: small farmers in
developing countries can gain access to modern
seed varieties with improved traits while commercial
breeders and plant scientists often need genetic
material from traditional varieties to develop

improved seeds (von der Osten 2005). The terms of
this sharing of genetic resources is a complex part
of any IPR policy for improved seeds. The CBD
recommends that developing countries should
share indigenous genetic resources and import
improved seeds or other genetically modified
organisms based on the principle of “informed
consent” and with significant “benefit sharing” for the
communities who provided the original germplasm
for any newly commercialized seed line.
Countries take different approaches to these
mandates. Consistent with the CBD, many nations
require some form of “informed consent” by local
communities for any private or commercial use of
local seed lines or germplasm, although the
mechanisms for obtaining that consent vary
significantly. In some cases, countries also require
compensation or “benefit sharing” with farmers or
indigenous communities for any use of local plant
lines or germplasm, raising complex issues of how
to organize this transfer of wealth from commercial
breeders to local farmers. Depending on the
approach, some national legislation on benefit
sharing may risk violating the TRIPS requirements
to protect the rights of commercial breeders
(Laxman and Ansari 2012). Benefit sharing
arrangements are also beset by practical challenges
such as the difficulty of assigning ownership or
credit for a particular “trait” or indigenous seed line
within various farming communities, or the
difficulties in creating contracts between private
sector and farming communities (Plahe 2011). In
addition, indigenous communities are often
vulnerable when negotiating over benefit sharing
due to their lack of political power and awareness of
the specifics of PVP rules, or their cultural rejection
of the private property assumptions behind such an
arrangement (DaVia 2012; Srinivasan 2003).
Protecting Farmer’s Seed Varieties
Finally, some nations use PVP laws to allow
farmers to protect their local varieties with their own
unique property rights, going beyond the “benefit
sharing” paradigm. Such policies allow farmers or
communities to legally register their distinct varieties
as intellectual property. At the same time, these
rules can require that varieties demonstrate
“novelty, distinctiveness, uniformity, and stability”
(NDUS) in order to receive formal recognition and
protection. While these standards are desirable for
commercial seed breeders, many farmers prefer
variation in their varieties in order to maintain
genetic diversity for future breeding and to protect
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against crop failures—preferences that make it
difficult to get their varieties protected unless
exceptions are made for farmers’ varieties in this
regard (DaVia 2012; Salazar et al. 2007).

4. Case Study: India’s Attempt to Balance
Breeders’ and Farmers’ Rights.
In this section we describe how a leading nation,
India, has balanced the conflicting obligations to
breeders and farmers as represented by TRIPS and
the CBD in its laws related to the development and
use of improved seed. The so-called “Indian model”
is often cited as an example for other nations
considering these opposing tensions in PVP laws,
especially other nations in South Asia. India also
offers several original ideas for protecting both
farmers’ and breeders’ rights, making it a useful
source of ideas for balancing the TRIPS and CBD
imperatives. The nation generally follows the UPOV
1978 model in developing its sui generis PVP
system, but seeks a complex balance between
breeders’ rights and farmers’ rights as described
below:
Protecting Collective and Informal Farming
Practices
India’s Protection of Plant Varieties and
Farmers’ Rights Act (PPVFRA) of 2001 protects
farmers’ rights to save, sow, resow, exchange,
share, use or sell seeds or the produce from seeds,
including even protected varieties of seed registered
under the law. The only limit on this right is that
farmers are not allowed to sell such seeds as
“branded” seeds, meaning they cannot label them
as being of a variety protected under the law. Thus,
India formally allows farmers to engage in
commercial use and even sale of protected seeds
as long as it is not under a breeder’s brand name.
Although the Indian law gives commercial breeders
the right to register essentially derived varieties
(EDVs) from a protected seed, this requires a
separate application process for those varieties and
remains subject to the strong farmers’ exemptions
to those commercial rights. In short, India includes
very strong protections of farmers’ informal
practices in its PVP regulations, even while allowing
for commercial protection of new improved seed
varieties by different commercial breeders.
Informed Consent and Benefit Sharing
Although India may seem to be very strong on
farmers’ rights in terms of protecting traditional uses
and even commercial trade by farmers in protected

seeds, the country’s rules are less favorable to
farmers in terms of prior informed consent and
benefit sharing for the use of local land races or
germplasm. The Biological Diversity Act (BDA) of
2002, enacted to meet the CBD mandate, does
require anyone seeking to use a “biological
resource” or “knowledge associated thereto” for
research or commercial development to get
permission from the National Biodiversity Authority.
In this respect, India’s approach to informed consent
is more focused on the national government than on
local communities, especially compared to other
proposed laws in South Asia related to
implementing these CBD provisions as discussed
below.
In terms of benefit sharing, the Biological
Diversity Act requires the National Biodiversity
Authority to ensure the “equitable sharing of
benefits” from any approved access to biological
resources. The law provides a range of options for
providing such benefit sharing, including joint
ownership of the resulting IPR with the National
Biodiversity Authority or another “benefit claimer”
such as local farmers, the location of new economic
development stemming from the new seed
technology, or direct monetary compensation to
those seeking benefits as the National Biodiversity
Authority determines appropriate. The law also
creates a National Biodiversity Fund, where
payments for benefit sharing may be deposited
before being allocated to the appropriate groups or
used for “conservation and promotion of biological
resources” in general.
Even India’s PVP law incorporates similar
provisions for benefit sharing for groups who have
contributed “genetic material” used to create a new
plant variety being protected. In this instance,
however, the burden is on the local farmers or other
claimants to seek benefit sharing by filing a claim
when a new commercial seed variety is registered.
Any required benefit sharing is to be paid to the
government’s National Gene Fund, to be used
either for direct payments to claimants, or for
“supporting the conservation and sustainable use of
genetic resources” in the field and in seed banks, as
well as other programs related to “breeding,
discovery or development of varieties” of seeds.
In both laws, therefore, benefit sharing is
structured more as a negotiation of claims
adjudicated by the government agency rather than
a right of local communities. The PVP law puts the
burden on local communities or other sources of
original germplasm to file a claim for benefit sharing
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when a new variety is registered, rather than on the
commercial firms doing the registration. While the
legislation requires authorities to advertise the
registration of new varieties, it may be difficult for
indigenous groups or subsistence farmers to keep
track of such registrations and file claims within that
period. In sum, both the Biodiversity and PVP laws
offer a weaker version of benefit sharing for farmers
who contribute local germplasm to a new
commercial seed variety compared to the very
strong protections offered for traditional farmer uses
of seeds, including improved seeds.
Protecting Farmers’ Seed Varieties
In contrast to its benefit sharing approach, India
provides fairly ambitious opportunities for farmers to
protect their local seed varieties with formal property
rights. The PVP legislation encourages farmers to
register their own “farmers’ varieties” of seeds with
the government, giving them a similar level of
protection to the registered seeds of commercial
seed breeders. Thus, India’s PVP law includes an
ambitious attempt to allow farmers to secure their
own IPR for their locally-created seed varieties,
even as it incorporates relatively weaker provisions
for other forms of benefit sharing for giving farmers
other compensation for the use of their local seed
lines in the creation of new commercial seeds.

5. Implications of the Indian Model
As noted, India was the first nation in South Asia
to enact formal laws to address both the TRIPS and
CBD mandates to protect breeders’ and farmers’
rights. Other nations in the region have debated
similar proposals with different degrees of emphasis
on farmers’ or breeders’ rights. Bangladesh, for
instance, has debated a biodiversity act that is even
more protective of farmers’ rights, including a
benefit sharing provision that requires that at least
50% of the “net monetary gain” from any
commercial use of a biological or genetic resource
goes to the relevant local community. Sri Lanka,
meanwhile, remains in major conflict over balancing
breeders’ and farmers’ rights as represented by a
2013 draft seed law that proposes more stringent
limitations on farmers’ uses of protected seed
varieties. Thus, other nations continue to struggle
with how to balance these two imperatives, in some
cases looking at India as an example.
At the same time, implementation of the Indian
rules is complex, and has led to mixed results.
Although some research argues that the PPVFRA
has helped increase private seed innovation and

higher yields for several crops (Kolady et al. 2012),
others are less sanguine about the effects of the
new law. Many farmers in India are mistrustful of
any IPR protections for seeds, seeing those
property rights as foreign to their culture and
imposed by external actors like the WTO. This
means farmers are often reluctant to register their
seed varieties as permitted under the Indian PVP
law. In addition, the bureaucratic complexities of
both seed registration and applications for benefit
sharing make these “farmers’ rights” difficult for
many rural farmers to negotiate or access (Plahe
2011;
Ramprasad
and
Clements
2016).
Registrations of farmers’ varieties have increased
significantly in the past two years: as of March 2015,
539 farmers’ varieties had been registered for IPR
protection under the Indian law (Bhutani 2015).
Most of those registrations happen, however, only
because of the work of “intermediaries”—
individuals and groups who encourage farmers to
register their varieties and help them negotiate the
significantly complex process to do so (Bhutani
2015; Ramprasad and Clements 2016). What
benefits will accrue to farmers from registering these
protected varieties, however, remains unclear. In
addition, it is evident that the actual system of seed
production and distribution proceeds in India, as in
other nations, according to a wide range of informal
rules that are often inconsistent with the formal rules
of the PPVFRA or the BDA, and that informal
networks of seed distribution do not strictly adhere
to the rules of the formal seed IPR system (c.f.
Herring 2007). Thus, changes in formal PVP rules
may have limited or surprising effects on some longstanding practices for seed distribution and use.

6. Conclusion
Those promoting improved seed technologies
as a mechanism for increasing food security and
access to nutrition face an important set of tensions
regarding the appropriate property rights
arrangements for such technologies. Current
international institutions offer important and
apparently conflicting requirements for national
policies to balance the rights of commercial
breeders and local farmers. There is passionate
disagreement about the best way to balance these
rights, with some arguing for the better incorporation
of benefit sharing and informed consent provisions
in TRIPS based PVP laws stressing improved
property rights for even farmers’ seed varieties, and
others rejecting an IPR-based approach to this
problem in favor of other alternatives to protect
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farmers and promote food security without relying
on stronger property rights. Meanwhile, developing
nations continue to struggle to identify policies that
can meet the conflicting international mandates for
farmers’ and breeders’ rights. Any future progress
on the equitable use of improved seeds to address
food security issues will require creative thinking
about the role of IPR in such a system, as well as a
recognition of the problematic relationship between
formal PVP and “access and benefit sharing” rules
as enacted and their actual implementation, as the
Indian experience has shown.
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